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STOCHASTIC CHOICE AND CONSIDERATION SETS
BY PAOLA MANZINI AND MARCO MARIOTTI1
We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent
considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability, the attention
parameter, and then chooses the alternative that maximizes a preference relation within
the set of considered alternatives. We show that this random choice rule is the only one
for which the impact of removing an alternative on the choice probability of any other
alternative is asymmetric and menu independent. Both the preference relation and the
attention parameters are identified uniquely by stochastic choice data.
KEYWORDS: Discrete choice, random utility, logit model, Luce model, consideration
sets, bounded rationality, revealed preferences.
1. INTRODUCTION
WE CONSIDER A BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL AGENT who maximizes a preference
relation but makes random choice errors due to imperfect attention. We ex-
tend the classical revealed preference method to this case of bounded ratio-
nality, and show how an observer of choice frequencies can (i) test, by means
of simple axioms, whether the data can have been generated by the model, and
(ii) if the answer to (i) is in the affirmative, infer uniquely both preferences and
attention.
Most models of economic choice assume deterministic behavior. Choice re-
sponses are a function c that indicates the selection c(A) the agent makes
from menu A. This holds true both for the classical “rational” model of pref-
erence maximization (Samuelson (1938), Richter (1966)) and for more recent
models of boundedly rational choice.2 Yet there is a gap between such theo-
ries and real data, which are noisy: individual choice responses typically ex-
hibit variability, in both experimental and market settings (McFadden (2000)).
We assume choice responses to be given by a probability distribution p that
indicates the probability p(aA) that alternative a is selected from menu A,
as in the pioneering work of Luce (1959), Block and Marschak (1960), and
Marschak (1960), and more recently Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2010)
(henceforth, GNP).
The source of choice errors in our model is the agent’s failure to consider all
feasible alternatives. For example, a consumer buying a new PC is not aware of
1We are grateful to three exceptionally thorough referees and a co-editor for many insightful
suggestions and for correcting errors. We also thank various seminar audiences, as well as Chris
Flynn, Jacob Goeree, Sean Horan, Rosa Matzkin, Kemal Ozbek, Mauro Papi, Ivan Soraperra,
Rani Spiegler, and Alex Tetenov for helpful comments on a previous related paper, “A Salience
Theory of Choice Errors” (IZA Discussion Paper 5006, 2010) in which the present paper origi-
nates. Financial support from ESRC Grant ES/J012513/1 is gratefully acknowledged.
2The works on deterministic choice mentioned later constitute examples for this assertion.
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all the latest models and specifications;3 a time-pressured doctor overlooks the
relevant disease for the given set of symptoms; an ideological voter deliberately
ignores some candidates independently of their policies.4 In these examples, the
agent is able to evaluate the alternatives he considers (unlike, e.g., a consumer
who is uncertain about the quality of a product). Yet, for various reasons, he
does not rationally evaluate all objectively available alternatives in A, but only
a (possibly strict) subset of them, the consideration set C(A). Once a C(A) has
been formed, a final choice is made by maximizing a preference relation over
C(A), which we assume to be standard (complete and transitive).
This two-step conceptualization of the act of choice is rooted in psychology
and marketing science, and it has recently gained prominence in economics
through the works of Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay (2012) (henceforth,
MNO) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a, 2011b). The core development in our
model with respect to earlier works is that the composition of C(A) is stochas-
tic. Each alternative a is considered with a probability γ(a), the attention pa-
rameter relative to alternative a. For example, γ(a) may indirectly measure the
degree of brand awareness for a product, or the (complement of) the willing-
ness of an agent to seriously evaluate a political candidate. The assumption
that γ(a) is menu independent is a substantive one. It does have, however, em-
pirical support in some contexts.5 And, at the theoretical level, the hypothesis
of independent attention parameters is a natural starting point. Unrestricted
menu dependence yields a model with no observable restrictions (Theorem 2),
while it is not clear a priori what partial restrictions should be imposed on
menu dependence.
MNO’s (2012) work is especially relevant for this paper, as it was the first
to study how attention and preferences can be retrieved from choice data in
a consideration set model of choice. However, like in many other two-stage
deterministic models of choice,6 it is not possible in that model to pin down
the primitives by observing the choice data that it generates.7 An attractive
feature of our approach is that it affords a unique identification of the prim-
itives. In particular, the preference for a over b is identified by the fact that
removing a from a menu containing b increases the probability that b is cho-
sen (this change in probability is called the impact of a on b). Our main result
(Theorem 1) characterizes the model with two simple axioms, which state the
asymmetry and menu independence of the impacts.
3Goeree (2008) quantified this phenomenon with empirical data.
4Wilson (2008) reported that African Americans tend to ignore Republican candidates in spite
of the overlap between their policy preferences and the stance of the Republicans, and even if
they are dissatisfied with the Democratic candidate.
5See, for example, van Nierop, Bronnenberg, Paap, Wedel, and Franses (2010).
6For example, our own “shortlisting” method (Manzini and Mariotti (2007)).
7We give an example in Section 6. Tyson (2013) clarified the general structure of two-stage
models of choice.
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The model can also be viewed as a special type of Random Utility Maxi-
mization (see Section 7.1) and it rationalizes some plausible types of choice
mistakes that cannot be captured by the Luce (1959) rule (the leading
type of restriction of Random Utility Maximization), in which p(aA) =
u(a)/
∑
b∈A u(b) for some strictly positive utility function u. The Luce rule
is equivalent to the multinomial logit model (McFadden (1974)) popular in
econometric studies, which assumes the maximization of a random utility with
additive and Gumbel-distributed errors. This is a very specific error model and
it is plausible to conjecture that an agent may make different types of mistakes.
The Luce rule is incompatible, for example, with choice frequency reversals of
the form p(a {ab c}) > p(b {ab c}) and p(b {ab}) > p(a {ab}). Be-
cause in our model the preference relation is asymmetric but it is not revealed
by crude choice probabilities, such reversals can be accommodated (Exam-
ple 1). Choice frequency reversals of various kinds have been observed experi-
mentally and they are natural when attention influences choice. For example, a
superior but unbranded cereal a may be chosen less frequently than a mediocre
but branded cereal b, simply because a is not considered. But if a third inter-
mediate cereal c becomes available, then b will be chosen less often (it will
not be chosen whenever c is considered), while a will be chosen with the same
frequency as before, so that a reversal may occur. Similarly, in spite of the
transitivity of the underlying preference, the random consideration set model
is compatible with forms of stochastic intransitivity that are instead excluded by
Luce (Section 4.2). Finally, a third important behavioral distinction from the
Luce rule concerns the well-known blue bus/red bus example (Section 4.1).
2. RANDOM CHOICE RULES
There is a nonempty finite set of alternatives X , and a domain D of subsets
(the menus) of X . We will assume that the domain satisfies the following “rich-
ness” assumption: {ab c} ∈D for all distinct ab c ∈X , and A ∈D whenever
B ∈D and A⊆ B. We allow the agent not to pick any alternative from a menu,
so we also assume the existence of a default alternative a∗ (e.g., walking away
from the shop, abstaining from voting, exceeding the time limit for a move in a
game of chess).8 Denote X∗ =X ∪ {a∗} and A∗ =A∪ {a∗} for all A ∈D.
DEFINITION 1: A random choice rule is a map p :X∗ ×D→[01] such that:∑
a∈A∗ p(aA) = 1 for all A ∈ D; p(aA) = 0 for all a /∈ A∗; and p(aA) ∈
(01) for all a ∈A∗, for all A ∈D \ ∅.
The interpretation is that p(aA) denotes the probability that the alterna-
tive a ∈A∗ is chosen when the possible choices (in addition to the default a∗)
8For a recent work on allowing “not choosing” in the deterministic case, see Gerasimou (2010).
Earlier work is Clark (1995).
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faced by the agent are the alternatives in A. Note that a∗ is the action taken
when the menu is empty, so that p(a∗∅)= 1.
We define a new type of random choice rule by assuming that the agent has
a strict preference ordering  on A. The preference  is applied only to a
consideration set C(A)⊆A of alternatives (the set of alternatives the decision
maker pays attention to). We allow for C(A) to be empty, in which case the
agent picks the default option a∗, so that p(a∗A) is the probability that C(A)
is empty. The membership of C(A) for the alternatives in A is probabilistic.
For all A ∈ D, each alternative a has a probability γ(a) ∈ (01) of being in
C(A). We state this formally as follows.
DEFINITION 2: A random consideration set rule is a random choice rule pγ
for which there exists a pair (γ), where  is a strict total order on X and γ
is a map γ :X → (01), such that9
pγ(aA)= γ(a)
∏
b∈A:ba
(
1 − γ(b)) for all A ∈D, for all a ∈A
3. CHARACTERIZATION
3.1. Revealed Preference and Revealed Attention
Suppose the choice data are generated by a random consideration set rule.
Can we infer the preference ordering from the choice data? One way to extend
the revealed preference ordering of rational deterministic choice to stochastic
choices is to declare a  b iff p(aA) > p(bA) for some menu A (see GNP
(2010)). However, depending on the underlying choice procedure, a higher
choice frequency for a might not be due to a genuine preference for a over b,
and indeed, this is not the way preferences are revealed in the random consid-
eration set model. The discrepancy is due to the fact that an alternative may
be chosen more frequently than another by virtue of the attention paid to it as
well as of its ranking. We consider a different natural extension of the deter-
ministic revealed preference that accounts for this feature while retaining the
same flavor as the standard nonstochastic environment.
In the deterministic case, the preference for a over b has (among others) the
observable feature that b can turn from rejected to chosen when a is removed.
This feature reveals unambiguously that a is preferred to b, and has an analog
in our random consideration set framework. When a is ranked below b, there
is no event in which the presence of a in the consideration set matters for
the choice of b; therefore, if removing a increases the choice probability of
b, it means that a must be better ranked than b. And conversely, if a  b,
then excising a from A removes the event in which a is considered (in which
9We use the convention that the product over the empty set is equal to 1.
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case b is not chosen), so that the probability of choosing b increases. Thus,
p(bA \ {a}) > p(bA) defines the revealed preference relation a  b of our
model. We will show that this relation is revealed uniquely.10
Next, given a preference , the attention paid to an alternative a is revealed
directly by the probability of choice in any menu in which a is the best al-
ternative. For example, in Theorem 1, we admit all singleton menus, so that
γ(a)= p(a {a})= 1 −p(a∗ {a}). However, γ(a) may be identified even when
the choice probabilities from some menus (singletons, in particular) cannot be
observed. Provided that there are at least three alternatives and that binary
menus are included in the domain, identification occurs via the formula
γ(a)= 1 −
√
p(a∗ {ab})p(a∗ {a c})
p(a∗ {b c}) 
which must hold since, under the model, p(a∗ {b c})= (1 − γ(b))(1 − γ(c)),
and therefore,
(
1 − γ(a))2p(a∗ {b c})
= (1 − γ(a))2[(1 − γ(b))(1 − γ(c))]
= [(1 − γ(a))(1 − γ(b))][(1 − γ(a))(1 − γ(c))]
= p(a∗ {ab})p(a∗ {a c})
This identification strategy can be further generalized using any disjoint
menus B and C instead of the alternatives b and c in the formula.11
These considerations suggest that the restrictions on observable choice data
that characterize the model are those ensuring that, first, the revealed pref-
erence relation  indicated above is well-behaved, that is, it is a strict total
order on the alternatives; and, second, that the observed choice probabilities
are consistent with this  being maximized on the consideration sets that are
stochastically generated by the revealed attention parameters.
3.2. Axioms and Characterization Theorem
Our axioms constrain the impact
p(aA \ {b})
p(aA)
10It is easy to see that p(aA) = p(aA \ {b}) also reveals the preference for a over b in our
model (again in analogy to rational deterministic choice).
11We thank two referees for suggesting these points.
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that an alternative b ∈ A ∈D has, in menu A, on another alternative a ∈ A∗,
with a 	= b. If p(aA\{b})
p(aA)
> 1, we say that b boosts a, and if p(aA\{b})
p(aA)
= 1, that b is
neutral for a. The axioms are intended for all AB ∈D and for all ab ∈A∩B,
a 	= b.
I-ASYMMETRY: p(aA\{b})
p(aA)
	= 1 ⇒ p(bA\{a})
p(bA)
= 1.
I-INDEPENDENCE: p(aA\{b})
p(aA)
= p(aB\{b})
p(aB)
and p(a
∗A\{b})
p(a∗A) = p(a
∗B\{b})
p(a∗B) .
i-Asymmetry says that if b is not neutral for a in a menu, then a must be
neutral for b in the same menu. Note how this axiom rules out randomness
due to “utility errors,” while it is compatible with “consideration errors.” It is a
stochastic analog of a property of rational deterministic choice: if the presence
of b determines whether a is chosen, then b is better than a, and therefore, the
presence of a cannot determine whether b is chosen.12
i-Independence states that the impact of an alternative on another cannot
depend on which other alternatives are present in the menu. It is a simple
form of menu independence, alternative to Luce’s IIA (Luce (1959)):
LUCE’S IIA: p(aA)
p(bA)
= p(aB)
p(bB)
.
i-Independence is structurally similar to Luce’s IIA except that it relates to
the impacts p(aA\{b})
p(aA)
instead of the odd ratios p(aA)
p(bA)
. These two properties ap-
pear to be equally plausible ways to capture aspects of menu independence.
If one thinks that preference should be menu independent, then the a priori
appeal of one or the other axiom hinges on a hypothesis about what pattern
reveals preference in the data. And, in turn, this rests on a hypothesis on the
cognitive process underlying choice. In the next section, we discuss further the
relationship between the two properties.
A first interesting implication of the axioms (valid on any domain including
all pairs and their subsets) is instructive on how they act and will be used in the
proof of the main result:
I-REGULARITY: p(aA\{b})
p(aA)
≥ 1 and p(a∗A\{b})
p(a∗A) ≥ 1.
i-Regularity yields, by iteration, the standard axiom of Regularity (or Mono-
tonicity),13 and says that if an alternative is not neutral for another alternative,
then it must boost it. While it is often assumed directly, this is not a completely
12On our specific domain, which contains singleton menus, i-Asymmetry could be weakened to
p(a{a})
p(a{ab}) 	= 1 ⇒ p(b{b})p(b{ab}) = 1 thanks to i-Independence.
13Regularity: A⊂ B ⇒ p(aA)≥ p(aB).
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innocuous property: it excludes, for example, the phenomenon of “asymmetric
dominance,” whereby adding an alternative that is clearly dominated by a but
not by b increases the probability that a is chosen.
LEMMA 1: If a random choice rulep satisfies i-Asymmetry and i-Independence,
then p also satisfies i-Regularity.
PROOF: Let p satisfy the assumptions in the statement. By i-Independence,
it is sufficient to show that p(a{b})
p(a{ab}) ≥ 1 and p(a
∗∅)
p(a∗{a}) ≥ 1 for all ab ∈ X . The
latter inequality is immediately seen to be satisfied since, by the definition of a
random choice rule and of a∗,
p(a∗∅)
p(a∗ {a}) =
1
1 −p(a {a}) > 1
in view of p(a {a}) ∈ (01). Next, suppose, by contradiction, that there exist
ab ∈X such that p(a{a})
p(a{ab}) < 1. By i-Independence, we have
p(a∗ {a})
p(a∗ {ab}) =
p(a∗∅)
p(a∗ {b})(1)
⇔ p(a∗ {a})p(a∗ {b})= p(a∗ {ab})
⇔ (1 −p(a {a}))(1 −p(b {b}))
= 1 −p(a {ab})−p(b {ab})
⇔ p(a {a})+p(b {b})−p(a {a})p(b {b})
= p(a {ab})+p(b {ab})
Moreover, the assumption p(a{a})
p(a{ab}) < 1 implies, by i-Asymmetry, that
p(b {b})= p(b {ab}). Therefore, formula (1) simplifies to
p
(
a {a})(1 −p(b {b}))= p(a {ab})
so that (since (1 − p(b {b})) < 1) p(a {a}) > p(a {ab}), which contradicts
p(a{a})
p(a{ab}) < 1. Q.E.D.
A useful additional observation is that formula (1) rules out p(a{a})
p(a{ab}) = 1 =
p(b{b})
p(b{ab}) , for otherwise, the contradiction p(a {a})p(b {b}) = 0 would follow.
Therefore, in the presence of i-Independence, i-Asymmetry is, in fact, equiva-
lent to the stronger version, as follows.
I-ASYMMETRY*: p(aA\{b})
p(aA)
	= 1 ⇔ p(bA\{a})
p(bA)
= 1.
Our main result is the following.
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THEOREM 1: A random choice rule satisfies i-Asymmetry and i-Independence
if and only if it is a random consideration set rule pγ . Moreover, both  and γ
are unique, that is, for any random choice rule p′γ′ such that p′γ′ = p, we have
(′γ′)= (γ).
All remaining proofs are in the Appendix. However, the logic behind the suf-
ficiency part of the proof is simple. Under the axioms, the revealed preference
relation described in Section 3.1 can be shown to be total, asymmetric, and
transitive, so that it is taken as our preference ranking . Given our domain,
the attention value γ(a) can be defined from the probabilities p(a {a}). Then
the axioms are shown to imply the following property: whenever b boosts a,
p
(
aA \ {b})= p(aA)
1 −p(b {b}) 
This is a weak property of “stochastic path independence” that may be of
interest in itself: it asserts that the boost of b on a must depend only on the
“strength” of b in singleton choice.14 Finally, the iterated application of this
formula shows that the preference and the attention parameters defined above
retrieve, in any menu, the given choice probabilities via the assumed proce-
dure.
4. EXPLAINING MENU EFFECTS AND STOCHASTIC INTRANSITIVITY
4.1. Menu Effects
Our model suggests that a reason why Luce’s IIA might not hold is that a
third alternative may be in different positions (in the preference ranking) rel-
ative to a and b and thus may arguably impact on their choice probabilities in
different ways. For a random consideration set rule, Luce’s IIA is only satisfied
for sets A and B that differ exclusively for alternatives each of which is either
better or worse than both a and b, but otherwise menu effects can arise. So if
a c  b and ab c ∈A,
pγ(aA)
pγ(bA)
= γ(a)
γ(b)(1 − γ(a))
∏
d∈A:adb
(1 − γ(d))
>
γ(a)
γ(b)(1 − γ(a))
∏
d∈A\{c}:adb
(1 − γ(d))
= pγ(aA \ {c})
pγ(bA \ {c})
14A similar stochastic path independence property appears as an axiom in Yildiz (2012).
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violating Luce’s IIA. In fact, for certain configurations of the attention param-
eters, the addition or elimination of other alternatives can even reverse the
ranking between the choice frequencies of two alternatives a and b:
EXAMPLE 1—Choice Frequency Reversal: Let a  c  b and γ(b) >
γ(a)
1−γ(a) > γ(b)(1 − γ(c)). Then
pγ
(
a {ab c})= γ(a) > γ(b)(1 − γ(a))(1 − γ(c))= p(b {ab c})
and
pγ
(
a {ab})= γ(a) < γ(b)(1 − γ(a))= pγ(b {ab})
The basis for the choice frequency reversal in our model is that while a better
alternative a may be chosen with lower probability than an inferior alternative
b in pairwise contests due to low attention for a, the presence of an alternative
c that is better than b but worse than a will reduce the probability that b is
noticed without affecting the probability that a is noticed, and possibly, if c at-
tracts sufficiently high attention, to the point that the initial choice probability
ranking between a and b is reversed.15
However, a random consideration set rule does satisfy other forms of menu
independence and consistency that look a priori as natural as Luce’s IIA. In
addition to i-Independence, it also satisfies the following, for all A ∈D, a ∈A∗,
and b c ∈A:
I-NEUTRALITY: p(aA\{c})
p(aA)
 p(bA\{c})
p(bA)
> 1 ⇒ p(aA\{c})
p(aA)
= p(bA\{c})
p(bA)
.
i-Neutrality states that an alternative has the same impact on any alternative
in the menu which it boosts. While an interesting property in itself, as it sim-
plifies dramatically the structure of impacts by forcing them to take on only
a single value in addition to 1, this is also a weakening of Luce’s IIA. In fact,
i-Neutrality also states that p(aA\{c})
p(bA\{c}) = p(aA)p(bA) under the boosting restriction in
the premise (guaranteeing, in our interpretation, that c is ranked above both
a and b), while Luce’s IIA asserts the same form of menu independence (and
more) unconditionally. Our previous discussion explains why this restriction of
Luce’s IIA may be sensible.
The dependence of the choice odds on the other available alternatives is of-
ten a realistic feature, which applied economists have sought to incorporate,
for example, in the multinomial logit model.16 The blue bus/red bus example
15Choice frequency reversals of various nature have been observed experimentally. See, for
example, Tsetsos, Usher, and Chater (2010).
16By adding a nested structure to the choice process (nested logit) or by allowing heteroscedas-
ticity of the choice errors (see, e.g., Greene (2003) or Agresti (2002)). A probit model also allows
for menu effects.
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(Debreu (1960)) is the standard illustration, in which menu effects occur be-
cause of an extreme “functional” similarity between two alternatives (a red and
a blue bus). Suppose the agent chooses, with equal probabilities, a train (t), a
red bus (r), or a blue bus (b) as a means of transport in every binary set, so that
the choice probability ratios in pairwise choices for any two alternatives are
equal to 1. Then, on the premise that the agent does not care about the color
of the bus and so is indifferent between the buses, it is argued that adding
one of the buses to a pairwise choice set including t will increase the odds of
choosing t over either bus, thus violating IIA.17
GNP (2010) suggested to deal with this form of menu dependence by propos-
ing that “duplicate” alternatives (such as a red and a blue bus) should be iden-
tified observationally, by means of choice data, and by assuming that duplicate
alternatives are (in a specific sense) “irrelevant” for choice. In the example,
each bus is an observational duplicate of the other because replacing one with
the other does not alter the probability of choosing t in a pairwise contest. The
assumption of duplicate elimination says, in this example, that the probability
of choosing t should not depend on whether a duplicate bus is added to either
choice problem that includes the train.18
Observe that GNP duplicates arise in the same way irrespective of whether
the train is better or worse than the bus. On the other hand, our model (once
straightforwardly adapted to account for preference ties) suggests a sharp dis-
tinction, which depends on the preference ranking between duplicates and
other alternatives. If the train is better than the buses, then the probability
of taking the train depends only on the attention paid to the train. Multiple
copies of an inferior bus are treated as duplicates. But multiple copies of a
superior bus are never redundant: they increase the chance that at least one
of them is noticed and, therefore, always reduce the probability of taking the
train.19 To illustrate, suppose that the preference relation is now a weak order
. All alternatives in the consideration set that tie for best are chosen with
a given probability, and otherwise the model is unchanged. Let γ(t) = y and
γ(b) = γ(r) = x. Assume first that t  b ∼ r. In this case, r and b are dupli-
cates according to GNP’s definition because pγ(t {b t}) = p(t {r t}) = y .
The duplicate elimination assumption holds because pγ(t {b r t}) = y . Let
β ∈ (01) be the probability that the blue bus is chosen when both buses are
considered. A straightforward calculation shows that, independently of the at-
tention profile γ and of β ∈ (01), the odds that the blue bus is chosen over the
17To be pedantic, Debreu’s original example used, as “duplicate” alternatives, two recordings
of Beethoven’s eighth symphony played by the same orchestra but with two different directors.
As preferences for directors can be very strong, we use, instead, McFadden’s (1974) version of
the example.
18The general duplicate elimination assumption is more involved but follows the same philos-
ophy.
19For this example, the “mood” interpretation of the model, explained in Section 7.1, may be
suitable.
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train necessarily increase when the red bus is made unavailable, which accords
(observationally) with the Debreu story (the ratio of the odds when r is present
to those without r is equal to 1 − (1 −β)x < 1).
Assume, instead, that b ∼ r  t. In this case, too, b and r are duplicates
because pγ(t {b t})= pγ(t {r t})= y(1 − x). But now the duplicate elim-
ination assumption fails since pγ(t {b r t})= y(1 − x)2 	= pγ(t {b t}). In-
dependently of the attention profile γ and of β ∈ (01), now the odds that the
blue bus is chosen over the train necessarily decrease when the red bus is made
unavailable, which is the reverse of the Debreu story (the ratio of the odds
when r is present to those without r becomes 1 + βx1−x > 1).
In conclusion, the blue bus/red bus example may be slightly misleading in
one respect. All commentators accept Debreu’s conclusion that once a red bus
is added to the pair {blue bus, train}, the odds of choosing the train over the
blue bus should increase. But this conclusion is not evident in itself: it must de-
pend on some conjecture about the cognitive process that generates the choice
data. A Luce-like model that captures this type of process was studied by GNP
(2010). The analysis above suggests that menu effects of a different type may
plausibly occur.
4.2. Stochastic Intransitivity
Several psychologists, starting from Tversky (1969), have argued that choices
may fail to be transitive. When choice is stochastic, there are many ways to
define analogues of transitive behavior in deterministic models. A weak such
analogue is the following:
WEAK STOCHASTIC TRANSITIVITY: For all ab c ∈ X , p(a {ab}) ≥ 12 ,
p(b {b c})≥ 12 ⇒ p(a {a c})≥ 12 .
It is easy to see that a random consideration set rule can account for viola-
tions of weak stochastic transitivity, and thus of the stronger version:
STRONG STOCHASTIC TRANSITIVITY: For all ab c ∈ X , p(a {ab}) ≥ 12 ,
p(b {b c})≥ 12 ⇒ p(a {a c})≥ max{p(a {ab})p(b {b c})}.
Consider the following.
EXAMPLE 2: Let γ(a)= 49 , γ(b)= 12 , and γ(c)= 910 , with a b c. We have
pγ
(
b {b c})= 1
2

pγ
(
c {a c})= 9
10
5
9
= 1
2

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but also
pγ
(
b {ab})= 1
2
5
9
= 5
18
<
1
2

violating weak stochastic transitivity.
The key for the violation in the example is that the ordering of the atten-
tion parameters is exactly opposite to the preference ordering. It is easy to
check that if the attention ordering weakly agrees with the preference order-
ing, choices are weakly stochastically transitive.
In their survey on choice anomalies, Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Meller
(2006) found that strong stochastic transitivity is violated in an overwhelming
number of studies, but they did not report frequent violations of weak stochas-
tic transitivity. So, in this respect, our model does not fill a gap by explaining a
large amount of data. However, Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Meller found that
when weak stochastic transitivity is violated, this happens in a systematic way.
Our model provides a way to think about this. When there is reason to assume
little variation in the attention paid to alternatives, or when better alternatives
are likely to be paid more attention, one should not expect violations of weak
stochastic transitivity. But one could expect violations in situations where bet-
ter alternatives are less likely to be paid attention to.
In general, the random consideration set rule reconciles a fundamentally
transitive motivation (the deterministic preference ) with stochastic viola-
tions of transitivity in the data. In contrast, the Luce rule must necessarily sat-
isfy weak stochastic transitivity.
5. MENU DEPENDENT ATTENTION PARAMETERS
In some circumstances, it may be plausible to assume that the attention pa-
rameter of an alternative depends on which other alternatives are feasible. For
example, a brightly colored object will stand out more in a menu whose other
elements are all gray than in a menu that only contains brightly colored objects.
In this section, we show, however, that a less restricted version of our model
that allows for the menu dependence of attention parameters is too permissive.
A menu dependent random consideration set rule is a random choice rule pδ
for which there exists a pair ( δ), where  is a strict total order on X and δ
is a map δ :X ×D \ ∅ → (01), such that
pδ(aA)
= δ(aA)
∏
b∈A:ba
(
1 − δ(bA)) for all A ∈D, for all a ∈A
THEOREM 2: For every strict total order  on X and for every random choice
rule p, there exists a menu dependent random consideration rule pδ such that
p= pδ.
STOCHASTIC CHOICE AND CONSIDERATION SETS 1165
So, once we allow the attention parameters to be menu dependent, not only
does the model fail to place any observable restriction on choice data, but
the preference relation is also entirely unidentified. Strong assumptions on the
function δ are needed to make the model with menu dependent attention use-
ful, but we find it difficult to determine a priori what assumptions would be
appropriate. The available empirical evidence on brands suggests at best weak
correlations between the probabilities of memberships of the consideration set,
and therefore weak menu effects.20
6. RELATED LITERATURE
The concept of consideration set originates in management science (Wright
and Barbour (1977)).21 The economics papers that are most related to ours
conceptually are MNO (2012) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a, 2011b). Exactly
as in their models, an agent in our model who chooses from menu A maximizes
a preference relation on a consideration set C(A). The difference lies in the
mechanism that determines C(A) (note that in the deterministic case, without
any restriction, this model is empirically vacuous, as one can simply declare the
observed choice from A to be equal to C(A)). While Eliaz and Spiegler fo-
cused on market competition and the strategic use of consideration sets, MNO
focused on the direct testable implications of the model and on the identifica-
tion of the parameters. Our work is thus more closely related to that of MNO.
When the consideration set formation and the choice data are deterministic,
as in MNO, consider a choice function c for which c({x y})= x= c({x y z}),
c({y z})= y , c({xz})= z. Then (as noted by MNO), we cannot infer whether
(i) x  z (in which case, z is chosen over x in a pairwise contest because x is
not paid attention to) or (ii) z  x (in which case, z is never paid attention to
in the larger set). The random consideration set model shows how richer data
can help break this type of indeterminacy. In case (i), the data would show that
the choice frequency of x is the same in {x y z} as in {x y}. In case (ii), the
data would show that the choice frequency of x would be higher in {x y} than
in {x y z}.
We next focus on the relationship with models of stochastic choice.22
20For example, van Nierop et al. (2010) estimated an unrestricted probabilistic model of con-
sideration set membership for product brands, and found that the covariance matrix of the
stochastic disturbances to the consideration set membership function can be taken to be diag-
onal.
21See also Shocker, Ben-Akiva, Boccara, and Nedungadi (1991), Roberts and Lattin (1991,
1997), and Roberts and Nedungadi (1995).
22Stochastic choice has also been used recently as a device in the literature of choice over
menus. For example, Koida (2010) studied how a decision maker’s (probabilistic) mental states
drive the choice of an alternative from each menu, in turn determining the agent’s preference for
commitment in his choice over menus. Ahn and Sarver (2013) instead used Gul and Pesendorfer’s
(2006) random expected utility model in the second period of a menu choice model, and showed
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Tversky’s (1972a, 1972b) classical Elimination by Aspects (EBA) rule pε,
which satisfies Regularity, is such that there exists a real valued function
U : 2X → ++ such that, for all A ∈D, a ∈A,
pε(aA)=
∑
B⊆X:B∩A	=A
U(B)pε(aB ∩A)
∑
B⊆X:B∩A	=∅
U(B)

There are random consideration set rules that are not EBA rules. Tver-
sky showed that, for any three alternatives ab c, EBA requires that if
pε(a {ab}) ≥ 12 and pε(b {b c}) ≥ 12 , then pε(a {a c}) ≥ min{pε(a {ab})
pε(b {b c})} (moderate stochastic transitivity). Example 2 shows that this re-
quirement is not always met by a random consideration set rule.
Recently, GNP (2010) have shown that, in a domain which is “rich” in a
certain technical sense, the Luce model is equivalent to the following Inde-
pendence property (which is an ordinal version of Luce’s IIA): p(aA∪C)≥
p(bB∪C) implies p(aA∪D)≥ p(bB∪D) for all sets ABC , and D such
that (A∪B)∩(C∪D)= ∅. They also generalized the Luce rule to the Attribute
Rule in such a way as to accommodate red bus/blue bus type of violations of
Luce’s IIA (see Section 4.1). We have seen that a random consideration set
rule violates one of the key axioms (duplicate elimination) for an Attribute
Rule. And the choice frequency reversal Example 1 violates the Independence
property above.
Mattsson and Weibull (2002) obtained an elegant foundation for (and gener-
alization of) the Luce rule. In their model, the agent (optimally) pays a cost to
get close to implementing any desired outcome (see also Voorneveld (2006)).
More precisely, the agent has to exert more effort the more distant the de-
sired probability distribution is from a given default distribution. When the
agent makes an optimal trade-off between the expected payoff and the cost
of decision control, the resulting choice probabilities are a “distortion” of the
logit model, in which the degree of distortion is governed by the default dis-
tribution. Our paper shares with this work the broad methodology to focus on
a detailed model to explain choice errors. However, it is also very different in
that Mattsson and Weibull assumed a (sophisticated form of) rational behavior
on the part of the agent. One may then wonder whether “utility-maximization
errors” might not occur at the stage of making optimal trade-offs between util-
ity and control costs, raising the need to model those errors. A second major
difference stems from the fact that our model uses purely ordinal preference
information. Similar considerations apply to the recent wave of works on ra-
tional inattention, such as Mateˇjka and McKay (2011), Cheremukhin, Popova,
how preference for flexibility yields a unique identification of subjective state probabilities. In this
paper, we have focused on choice from menus.
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and Tutino (2011), and Caplin and Dean (2013), in which it was assumed that
an agent solves the problem of allocating attention optimally.
Recently, Rubinstein and Salant (2012) have proposed a general frame-
work to describe an agent who expresses different preferences under different
frames of choice. The link with this paper is that the set of such preferences
is interpreted as a set of deviations from a true (welfare relevant) preference,
so this is a model of “mistakes.” However, the deviations are not analyzed as
stochastic events.
Finally, we note that the appeal of a two-stage structure with a stochastic
first stage extends beyond economics, from psychology to consumer science. In
philosophy in particular, it has been taken by some (e.g., James (1956), Den-
nett (1978), Heisenberg (2009)) as a fundamental feature of human choices,
and as a solution of the general problem of free will.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS23
7.1. Random Consideration Sets and RUM
A Random Utility Maximization (RUM) rule (Block and Marschak (1960))
is defined by a probability distribution π on the possible rankings R of the
alternatives and the assumption that the agent picks the top element of the R
extracted according to π. Block and Marschak (1960), McFadden (1974), and
Yellott (1977) have shown that the Luce model is a particular case of a RUM
rule, in which a systematic utility is subject to additive random shocks that
are Gumbel distributed. A random consideration set rule (γ) is a different
special type of RUM rule, in which π is restricted as follows:
• π(R)= 0 for any ranking R for which there are alternatives ab with a
b, bRa, aRa∗, and bRa∗ (i.e., if R contradicts  on some pair of alternatives,
then at least one of these alternatives must be R-inferior to a∗);
• for any alternative a, π({R :aRa∗})= γ(a) (i.e., the probability of the set
of all rankings for which a is ranked above a∗ coincides with the probability
that a is noticed);
• for any two alternatives a and b, π({R :aRa∗ and bRa∗})= γ(a)γ(b) (i.e.,
the events of any two alternatives being ranked above a∗ are independent).
For example, a random consideration set rule with two alternatives (beside
the default) such that γ(a) = 12 , γ(b) = 13 , and a  b could be represented by
the following RUM rule:24 π(aba∗)= 16 , π(aa∗b)= 13 , π(ba∗a)= 16 , π(a∗ab)=
π(a∗ba)= 16 , π(baa∗)= 0.
An appealing interpretation of this type of RUM is that the agent is “in the
mood” for an alternative a with probability γ(a) (and otherwise prefers the de-
fault alternative), and picks the preferred one among all alternatives for which
23We thank the referees for suggesting most of the insights in this section.
24Where a ranking is denoted by listing the alternatives from top to bottom.
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he is in the mood. While indistinguishable in terms of pure choice data, the
RUM interpretation and the consideration set interpretation imply different
attitudes of the agent to “implementation errors”: if a is chosen but b  a is
implemented by mistake (e.g., a dish different from the one ordered is served
in a restaurant), the agent will have a positive reaction if he failed to pay atten-
tion to b, but he will have a negative reaction if he was not in the mood for b.
7.2. Comparative Attention
The model suggests a definition of comparative attention based on observed
choice probabilities. Say that (1γ1) is more attentive than (2γ2), denoted
(1γ1)α(2γ2), iff p1γ1(a∗A) < p2γ2(a∗A) for all A ∈D. Then we have
that (1γ1)α(2γ2) iff γ1(a) > γ2(a) for all a ∈X (the “if” direction follows
immediately from the formula pγ(a∗A) =∏a∈A(1 − γ(a)), while the other
direction follows from pγ(a∗ {a})= (1−γ(a)) applied to each {a} ∈D). Ob-
serve that, for two agents with the same preferences, (γ1) is more attentive
than (γ2) iff agent 1 makes “better choices” from each menu in the sense of
first order stochastic dominance, that is, pγ1(a bA) > pγ2(a bA) for
all b ∈A with b 	= max(A), where pγ(a bA) denotes the probability of
choosing an alternative in A better than b.
On general domains (without the assumption that all singleton menus are
included in the domain), the implication (1γ1)α(2γ2) ⇒ γ1(a) > γ2(a)
for all a ∈ X does not necessarily hold. However, in a one-parameter version
of the model in which all alternatives receive the same attention g ∈ (01),
it follows from the formula pg(a∗A) = (1 − g)|A| that (1 g1)α(2 g2) iff
g1 > g2.
7.3. A Model Without Default
A natural companion of our model that does not postulate a default alterna-
tive is one in which, whenever the agent misses all alternatives, he is given the
option to “reconsider,” repeating the process until he notices some alternative.
This leads to choice probabilities of the form
pγ(aA)=
γ(a)
∏
b∈A:ba
(1 − γ(b))
1 −
∏
b∈A
(1 − γ(b))

This model does not have the same identifiability properties as ours. For ex-
ample, take the case X = {ab}, with p(a {ab}) = α and p(b {ab})= β.25
These observations (which fully identify the parameters in our model) are com-
25Obviously, in this model, p(a {a})= 1 for all a ∈X .
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patible with both the following continua of possibilities:
• a b and any γ such that γ(a)1−γ(a) = αβγ(b);
• b a and any γ such that γ(b)1−γ(b) = βαγ(a).
Nevertheless, the model is interesting and it would be desirable to have an
axiomatic characterization of it. We leave this as an open question.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The necessity part of the statement is immediately verified by checking
the formula and is thus omitted here (see Manzini and Mariotti (2014)).
For sufficiency, let p be a random choice rule that satisfies i-Asymmetry and
i-Independence. By Lemma 1, p also satisfies i-Regularity, and by the observa-
tion after the proof of Lemma 1, it satisfies i-Asymmetry* (below, we will high-
light where this stronger version of i-Asymmetry is needed). Define a binary
relation R on X by aRb iff p(bA \ {a}) > p(bA) for some A ∈D, ab ∈A.
We show that R is total, asymmetric, and transitive. For totality, given ab ∈X ,
suppose p(bA \ {a}) ≤ p(bA) for some A ∈ D (by the domain assump-
tion, there exists an A ∈D such that ab ∈ A); then by i-Regularity, p(bA \
{a}) = p(bA) and by i-Asymmetry*, p(aA \ {b}) > p(aA). For asymme-
try, suppose p(bA \ {a}) > p(bA) for some A ∈ D; then by i-Asymmetry,
p(aA \ {b})= p(aA) and by i-Independence, p(aB \ {b})= p(aB) for all
B  ab, B ∈D.
For transitivity, it is convenient to introduce additional notation. For all
A ∈ D and for all ab ∈ A, define xa = p(a {a}) and λab = p(aA)p(aA\{b}) . By
i-Independence, λab is well-defined. In particular, for all ab c ∈ X , we have
(using the domain assumption)
p(a {ab c})
p(a {a c}) =
p(a {ab})
p(a {a}) = λab(2)
From (2), it follows that, for all ab c ∈X ,
p
(
a {ab})= λabxa(3)
p
(
a {ab c})= λacλabxa
Now fix any particular ab c ∈X . By i-Independence,
p(a∗∅)
p(a∗ {a}) =
p(a∗ {b})
p(a∗ {ab}) =
p(a∗ {c})
p(a∗ {a c}) =
p(a∗ {b c})
p(a∗ {ab c})
which implies
p
(
a∗ {ab})= p(a∗ {b})p(a∗ {a})
p
(
a∗ {ab c})= p(a∗ {a})p(a∗ {b c})
= p(a∗ {a})p(a∗ {b})p(a∗ {c})
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Since
∑
a∈A∗ p(aA)= 1, considering the menu {ab c} and all its binary sub-
sets, using (3) and writing p(a∗ {i}) as 1 − xi, i ∈ {ab c}, we have
λacλabxa + λbcλbaxb + λcaλcbxc + (1 − xa)(1 − xb)(1 − xc)= 1
λabxa + λbaxb + (1 − xa)(1 − xb)= 1
λacxa + λcaxc + (1 − xa)(1 − xc)= 1
λbcxb + λcbxc + (1 − xb)(1 − xc)= 1
which can be rearranged, after expanding the products in (1 − xi), as
xaxb + xaxc + xbxc
= (1 − λacλab)xa + (1 − λbcλba)xb + (1 − λcaλcb)xc + xaxbxc
(1 − λab)xa + (1 − λba)xb = xaxb
(1 − λac)xa + (1 − λca)xc = xaxc
(1 − λbc)xb + (1 − λcb)xc = xbxc
Substitute the last three equations in the first one and rearrange to obtain
(1 − λab)(1 − λac)xa + (1 − λba)(1 − λbc)xb + (1 − λca)(1 − λcb)xc(4)
= xaxbxc
Now suppose by contradiction that R is not transitive, that is, let aRbRc and
not(aRc). Therefore, λba > 1 and λcb > 1, and then by i-Asymmetry,
λab = 1 = λbc
Moreover, by totality, cRa, that is, there exists C ∈D such that p(aC \ {c}) >
p(aC) and thus, by i-Independence, λac > 1, and then by i-Asymmetry,
λca = 1
Substitute the values of λab, λbc , and λca in equation (4) to obtain the contra-
diction 0 = xaxbxc > 0. We conclude that R is transitive.
Finally, concerning R, observe that (using i-Asymmetry* and i-Indepen-
dence) the following three statements are equivalent:
aRb(5)
p
(
bA \ {a})>p(bA) for all A ∈D with ab ∈A
p
(
aA \ {b})= p(aA) for all A ∈D with ab ∈A
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Next, we show that, for all A ∈D, the following implication holds:
p
(
aA \ {b})>p(aA) ⇒ p(aA \ {b})
p(aA)
= 1
1 −p(b {b})(6)
for all a ∈A∗ and b ∈A. We begin by proving (6) for a= a∗. Suppose first that
A= {b} for some b ∈X . Since p(a∗∅)= 1 and p(a∗ {b})= 1 −p(b {b}), we
have
p(a∗∅)
p(a∗ {b}) =
1
1 −p(b {b})(7)
so that the assertion holds for this case. Then applying i-Independence to (7),
we have immediately
p(a∗A \ {b})
p(a∗ {A}) =
1
1 −p(b {b})
for all A ∈ D, for all b ∈ A. Next, fix ab ∈ A and assume p(aA \ {b}) >
p(aA), so that, by i-Asymmetry, p(bA\ {a})= p(bA). Using this equation
and i-Independence yields
p(aA \ {b})
p(aA)
= p(a {a})
p(a {ab}) =
1 −p(a∗ {a})
1 −p(b {ab})−p(a∗ {ab})
= 1 −p(a
∗ {a})
1 −p(b {b})−p(a∗ {ab})
and since, as shown before,
p
(
a∗ {a})= p(a∗ {ab})
1 −p(b {b})
we have
p(aA \ {b})
p(aA)
=
1 − p(a
∗ {ab})
1 −p(b {b})
1 −p(b {b})−p(a∗ {ab}) =
1
1 −p(b {b}) 
This concludes the proof that formula (6) holds.
Now define = R and γ(a) = p(a {a}) for all a ∈ X . We show that
pγ = p. Fix A ∈D and number the alternatives so that A= {a1     an} and
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ai  aj ⇔ i < j. For all a ∈ A, the implication in (6) and the definitions of γ
and  imply that
p(aiA) = p
(
ai {a2     an}
)(
1 − γ(a1)
)

= p(ai {ai     an})∏
j<i
(
1 − γ(aj)
)
= p(ai {ai})∏
j<i
(
1 − γ(aj)
)
= γ(ai)
∏
j<i
(
1 − γ(aj)
)= pγ(aiA)
where p(ai {ai})= p(ai {ai     an}), which is used to move from the second
to the third line, follows from the properties of R in (5) (note that the proba-
bilities in the display are all well-defined by the domain assumption).
To conclude, we show that  and γ are defined uniquely. Let p′γ′ be an-
other consideration set rule for which p′γ′ = p, and suppose by contradic-
tion that ′ 	=. So there exist ab ∈ X such that a  b and b ′ a. Take
A= {a} ∪ {c ∈X :a c}, so that b ∈A for some b with b′ a. By definition,
pγ(aA)= γ(a)= pγ(aB)
for all B ⊂A such that a ∈ B, but also
p′γ′(aA) = γ′(a)
∏
c∈A:c′a
(
1 − γ′(c))< γ′(a) ∏
c∈A\{b}:c′a
(
1 − γ′(c))
= p′γ′
(
aA \ {b})
a contradiction in view of p′γ′ = p= pγ . So  is unique. The uniqueness of
γ is immediate from p(a {a})= γ(a).
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let p be a random choice rule. Let  be an arbitrary strict total order of the
alternatives. Define δ by setting, for A ∈D \ ∅ and a ∈A:
δ(aA)= p(aA)
1 −
∑
b∈A:ba
p(bA)
(8)
We have δ(aA) > 0 since p(aA) > 0, and we have δ(aA) < 1 since 1 >
p(aA)+∑b∈A:ba p(bA) (given that p(a∗A) > 0).
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For the rest of the proof, fix a ∈A. We define
pδ(aA)= δ(aA)
∏
b∈A:ba
(
1 − δ(bA))
and show that pδ(aA) = p(aA). Using the definition of δ, for all b ∈ A,
we have
1 − δ(bA)=
1 −
∑
c∈A:cb
p(cA)−p(bA)
1 −
∑
c∈A:cb
p(cA)
(9)
so that
∏
b∈A:ba
(
1 − δ(bA))= ∏
b∈A:ba
1 −
∑
c∈A:cb
p(cA)−p(bA)
1 −
∑
c∈A:cb
p(cA)
(10)
Given any b ∈A, denote by b+ ∈A the unique alternative for which b+  b
and there is no c ∈A such that b+  c  b. Letting b ∈ {c ∈A : c  a}, from (9)
we have that
1 − δ(b+A)=
1 −
∑
c∈A:cb+
p(cA)−p(b+A)
1 −
∑
c∈A:cb+
p(cA)
=
1 −
∑
c∈A:cb
p(cA)
1 −
∑
c∈A:cb+
p(cA)

As the numerator of the expression for 1 − δ(b+A) is equal to the denom-
inator of the expression for 1 − δ(bA), the product in (10) is a telescoping
product (where observe that, for the -maximal term in A, the denominator is
equal to 1), and we thus have
∏
b∈A:ba
(
1 − δ(bA))= 1 − ∑
b∈A:ba+
p(bA)−p(a+A)
= 1 −
∑
b∈A:ba
p(bA)
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We conclude that
pδ(aA) = δ(aA)
∏
b∈A:ba
(
1 − δ(bA))
= p(aA)
1 −
∑
b∈A:ba
p(bA)
(
1 −
∑
b∈A:ba
p(bA)
)
= p(aA)
as desired (where the first term in the second line follows from (8)).
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